Agent Security · In build
Software used to wait to be told. Now it acts.
Every control you have assumes a person is behind the action — a login, a review, a four-eyes check. An agent holds the credential, decides, and moves at machine speed. The assumption is what broke, not the tooling.
What changed
An intelligence layer earns its keep by composing capabilities and acting before a customer asks. That is the whole argument this firm makes. It also means software now holds authority that used to sit with a named person.
Your identity system models employees. Your audit log records who clicked. Your approval flows assume someone reads them. None of that describes a process that authenticates as a service account, touches six systems in four seconds, and leaves a trace nobody can reconstruct an intention from.
The gap is not that agents are insecure. It is that the controls around them were designed for a different kind of actor, and they fail quietly rather than loudly.
What we build
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Identity for non-human actors
Every agent is a named principal, not a shared service account. You can answer which agent acted, on whose behalf, under what version of its instructions.
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Permissions scoped to the task
An agent composing a short-term loan gets the lending capability for that composition, not standing access to it. Authority is granted per job and expires with it.
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An audit trail you can reconstruct intent from
Not a log of API calls. A record of what the agent was asked, what it decided, what it touched and what it changed — readable by someone who was not there.
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Containment that works at machine speed
A human incident response measured in hours is useless against a loop running in seconds. Revocation has to be as fast as the thing it is revoking.
What this is not
- It is not a promise to solve security. Anyone selling you that is selling you a feeling. This narrows one specific gap: authority held by software that acts on its own.
- It is not a replacement for your existing controls. Your perimeter, your endpoint tooling and your SOC all still do their jobs. None of them were built to govern a non-human actor, and that is the only thing being added.
- It is not about attacks that use AI. Deepfake fraud and generated phishing are real and are someone else's product. This is about the agents you deploy yourself.
- It is not ready. It is in build. If you need something in production this quarter, we will say so rather than sell you a roadmap.
In build
Tell us what your agents can reach.
We are building this with a small number of companies already running agents against real systems. If that is you, the useful first conversation is an inventory: which agents exist, what credentials they hold, and what the worst one could do in an afternoon.